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Gas Supply and EU–Russia Relations

Evert Faber Van Der Meulen

Europe-Asia Studies, 2009, vol. 61, issue 5, 833-856

Abstract: Drawing on New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory, the article argues that EU energy policy towards Russia damages security of supply because it neglects the specific aims and propensities of Russia and Gazprom. EU Commission initiatives are based on the promotion of interdependence through market opening, favouring a policy of competition over security of supply. The reason for this focus is found in the EU's embedded inclination towards liberal markets. Russia, by contrast, has chosen suboptimal state control of natural resources over the frontier capitalism of the 1990s. Sustainability of the current rent based system and geopolitical considerations are essential to Russia and Gazprom. In this situation a pragmatic approach that aims at security of supply and security of demand seems to be more successful. In this approach, liberalisation of the market can only be a long-term goal.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1080/09668130902905040

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