Theorizing the Financial Statecraft of Emerging Powers

Leslie Elliott Armijo and Saori N. Katada

New Political Economy, 2015, vol. 20, issue 1, 42-62

Abstract: 'Financial statecraft', or the intentional use of credit, investment and currency levers by the incumbent governments of creditor - and sometimes debtor - states for both international economic and political advantage, has a long history, ranging from money doctors to currency wars. A neorealist, zero-sum framing of international monetary relations is not inevitable, yet casts a persistent shadow especially during periods of prospective interstate power transitions when previously peripheral countries find themselves with unexpected new capabilities. This article seeks to understand and theorise the financial statecraft of emerging economies, moving beyond the traditional understanding that closely identifies the concept with financial sanctions imposed by a strong state on a weaker state. We propose that the aims of financial statecraft may be either 'defensive' or 'offensive'. Financial statecraft may be targeted either 'bilaterally' or 'systemically'. Finally such statecraft may employ instruments that are either 'financial' or 'monetary'. As emerging market economies have moved up in the ranks in the interstate distribution of capabilities, they have also expanded their financial statecraft strategies from narrowly defensive and bilateral to those involving offensive tactics and targeted at the global and systemic level. Historical and contemporary examples illustrate the analysis.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2013.866082

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