 Mobilizing moral boundaries: the politics of derivatives reform in the USAgnes Orban New Political Economy, 2016, vol. 21, issue 6, 555-573 Abstract: This paper explains the reform of derivatives markets in the US by stressing the influence of moral distinctions on financial market regulation. The results show that business and consumer groups outside finance activate boundaries between legitimate risk management and illegitimate speculative practices. This categorical distinction delegitimised certain practices within the financial industry and affected both the relative power of interest groups and the political agenda. First, the mobilisation of moral boundaries strengthened the position of legitimate groups and weakened that of the financial industry in negotiations. This forced the latter to alter its lobbying strategies. Second, by highlighting inappropriate speculative practices, groups outside the financial sector changed policy-makers’ perception of problems. Policy-makers adopted a position which is congruent with broader moral understandings. The study is based on data from Congressional hearings, interviews, media articles, letters and interest group publications. The process tracing analysis advances our understanding of the social mechanisms linking moral perceptions and institutional change in financial markets. Date: 2016 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:cnpexx:v:21:y:2016:i:6:p:555-573 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2016.1162777 Access Statistics for this article New Political Economy is currently edited by Professor Colin Hay More articles in New Political Economy from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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