Death by a Thousand Cuts? Financial Political Power and the Case of the European Financial Transaction Tax

Manolis Kalaitzake

New Political Economy, 2017, vol. 22, issue 6, 709-726

Abstract: Since the global financial crisis, a variety of explanations have been advanced to account for the weak response by policy-makers to the issue of financial regulation. This paper focuses upon the strategic political mobilisation of financial actors in order to provide a better understanding of their influence within regulatory battles in the post crisis era. It does so through a case study investigation of the European Union Financial Transaction Tax. Despite garnering support from leading member states, the European Commission and Parliament, and a majority of the European population, the policy has failed to materialise as a result of several postponements and unresolved negotiations at the Council of the European Union. Policy-makers have also gradually backed away from the aggressive proposal designed by the Commission, committing to a range of exemptions that threaten to render the policy ineffective at raising significant revenue and at preventing industry avoidance of the charge. The case provides evidence of a cohesive political strategy conducted primarily by transnational financial associations and demonstrates the unique capacity of financial actors to secure favourable regulatory outcomes. Specifically, this influence is exercised through the recruitment of non-financial sector allies and by exploiting the structural dependency fears of policy-makers.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2017.1311850

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