Revenue guarantee in public-private partnerships: a fair risk allocation model

Nunzia Carbonara, Nicola Costantino and Roberta Pellegrino

Construction Management and Economics, 2014, vol. 32, issue 4, 403-415

Abstract: Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are adopted throughout the world for delivering public infrastructure. Despite the attractiveness of the PPP structure, its implementation has not been without trouble due to multiple uncertainties embedded with PPP projects. Private investors often require some mitigation of these risks through government support. One of the most common forms of government support is minimum revenue guarantee (MRG). A real option-based model is developed that uses a new mechanism for setting the revenue guarantee level secured by the government, which balances the private sector's profitability needs and the public sector's fiscal management interests and uses the concept of fairness for structuring MRGs. The model uses Monte Carlo simulation to take into account the uncertainty. The model is applied to the projected 1 kilometre long 'Camionale di Bari' toll road that will link the port of Bari (located in Puglia, Southern Italy) with the existing road network without affecting the urban traffic. It was found that government support is often needed to make the project attractive to private investors and that the developed model can be, for both public and private sectors, a valid tool for defining the fair value of the minimum amount of revenue secured by the government.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1080/01446193.2014.906638

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