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Remaking the military industrial relationship: A French-American comparison

Ann Markusen and Claude Serfati

Defence and Peace Economics, 2000, vol. 11, issue 1, 271-299

Abstract: Defense industrial complexes in leading Cold War nations have downsized and reallocated resources to other productive activities in the 1990s. In this paper, we analyze the experience of two key countries - the US and France. Comparing the two countries, we find similar outcomes in budgetary retrenchment and large firm restructuring but marked differences in the pace of downsizing and diversification among small and medium-sized firms. We hypothesize that three sets of contextual differences may explain these differences: 1) institutional differences in the way that the State bureaucracies - the Pentagon and the French Delegation generale pour l'armement (DGA) - oversee defense industrial matters, 2) differences in military industry ownership and firm size patterns, and 3) differences in the regional distribution of defense industrial capacity and associated regional policies. In closing, we note that the two countries' defense industrial complexes are becoming more alike and speculate on the significance of invidious competition and interactions between them. We address briefly the future of French/American arms industrial competition and cooperation, given the trend towards transnational security arrangements and defense industry globalization

Keywords: defense industry; civil/military integration; defense conversion; military procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1080/10430710008404950

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