The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes

Vincenzo Bove and Jennifer Brauner ()

Defence and Peace Economics, 2016, vol. 27, issue 5, 609-625

Abstract: This paper examines whether there are systematic differences in military spending between different types of autocratic regimes. We view military expenditure as an instrument a dictator can exploit in order to stay in power. How he utilises this instrument depends on the institutional set-up of his regime. We distinguish between military regimes, single party states and personalist regimes, and predict that military regimes should have the highest, whereas personalist dictatorships should have the lowest level of military spending. Using panel data on 64 dictatorships from 1960 to 2000, we find empirical evidence that our hypotheses are not rejected.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Working Paper: The Demand for Military Expenditure in Authoritarian Regimes (2011)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2014.925325

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