Dynamic-opportunistic behaviour in local government contracting-out decisions during the electoral cycle

Emilio J. de la Higuera-Molina, Ana M. Plata-Díaz, Antonio M. López-Hernández and José L. Zafra-Gómez

Local Government Studies, 2019, vol. 45, issue 2, 175-195

Abstract: A major question for public managers is whether municipal services should be rendered in-house or contracted out. In view of the negative perceptions often aroused by contracting out, this political decision might be framed within a theoretical model that we term ‘dynamic-opportunistic behaviour’. According to this model, the probability of municipal services being contracted out is greater in the years immediately following elections; moreover, during this period the decision is taken more quickly. In this theoretical model, not all factors (budgetary, economic, political, service characteristics and socio-economic) have an equal impact on the contracting-out decision during each year of the electoral cycle. The model was applied to a sample of 2,274 Spanish municipalities, with respect to a broad time horizon (2002–2014), and the results obtained confirm our hypotheses regarding dynamic-opportunistic behaviour in the contracting out of local public services.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/03003930.2018.1533819

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