EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Do entrepreneurial firms suffer more from bribery? An empirical study of businesses in Vietnam

Thang V. Nguyen, Ngoc T. B. Le, Ha L. H. Dinh and Huong T. L. Pham

Post-Communist Economies, 2020, vol. 32, issue 7, 877-903

Abstract: Empirical research on firm corruption has reported inconclusive findings on bribe–growth relationship at the firm level. Scholars have proposed a contingency approach, but a framework for identifying contingent factors has not been developed. This study employs a bargaining power framework to examine how firm characteristics moderate the bribe–growth relationship. Based on data from a sample of garment and textile firms in Vietnam, the research shows that firms with state ownership and export markets enjoy greater net benefits from bribes. By contrast, privately owned, micro and small firms are most harshly hit by bribes. The results suggest that engaging in bribery is not an answer for private, small firms even in bribery-prone environments like Vietnam. Rather, these firms should develop their bargaining power in order to minimise harms from bribery.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/14631377.2020.1722585 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:pocoec:v:32:y:2020:i:7:p:877-903

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CPCE20

DOI: 10.1080/14631377.2020.1722585

Access Statistics for this article

Post-Communist Economies is currently edited by Roger Clarke

More articles in Post-Communist Economies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:pocoec:v:32:y:2020:i:7:p:877-903