Earnings Management Around Zero: A motivation to local politician signalling competence

Augusta Ferreira, João Carvalho and Fátima Pinho

Public Management Review, 2013, vol. 15, issue 5, 657-686

Abstract: Literature earnings management aims to determine what causes/motivates managers to disclose earnings close to zero and to use this as an instrument to influence users' decisions. However, limited research has been carried out on this subject in the public sector. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether local politicians (in Portuguese municipalities), aiming to demonstrate their high level of competence and skills, engage in earnings management in such a way as to ensure that earnings are positive but close to zero. We examined whether political competition is a determining factor of earnings management close to zero and if managers use discretionary accruals in order to do this. Results indicate that, in order to report positive net earnings close to zero, discretionary accruals are used. This study identified the overriding tendency to avoid the reporting of losses in those municipalities where political competition is greatest.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2012.707679

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