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Mandate Versus Championship: Vertical government intervention and diffusion of innovation in public services in authoritarian China

Zhu

Public Management Review, 2014, vol. 16, issue 1, 117-139

Abstract: This research focuses on innovation and its diffusion in public services in authoritarian China. A mechanism between vertical government intervention and diffusion of innovation in public services is established by conducting a comparative case study between Sichuan and Tianjin. Administrative commands facilitate the formation of the 'mandatory policy diffusion' that rapidly diffuses policy instruments. Competition in the performance evaluation-based personnel system contributes to the formation of 'championship policy diffusion', which leads to the divergence of policy instruments in neighbouring local governments. Therefore, classic theoretical hypotheses on geographical proximity, competition, and vertical intervention concerning innovation diffusion need to be modified.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2013.798028

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