Faking performance together: systems of performance evaluation in Russian enforcement agencies and production of bias and privilege

Ella Paneyakh

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2014, vol. 30, issue 2-3, 115-136

Abstract: A specialist on Russian law enforcement examines a critical source of prosecution and conviction bias in that country – the system by which prosecutors, police, judges, and other legal professionals are evaluated. More specifically, she demonstrates how that system (exclusive of any inherent corruption or bias) institutionalizes incentives for the prosecution of large numbers of defendants in routine cases for the purpose of meeting informal quotas. Officials from a variety of law enforcement agencies, seeking to “hit their numbers,” develop techniques of selecting the “right” cases (and avoiding “wrong” ones), manipulating charges depending on the victim's and defendant's statuses.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2013.858525

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