 Corporate raiding and the role of the state in RussiaPost-Soviet Affairs, 2014, vol. 30, issue 2-3, 89-114 Abstract: To what extent are Russian state agencies involved in predatory behavior, and what are the determinants of their activities? Analyzing a novel data-set comprising 312 cases of illegal corporate raiding (reyderstvo) between 1999 and 2010, this article identifies a shift both in the regional and sectoral distribution of raids over time, as well as an increasing participation of state agencies in criminal raiding attacks. Using panel regression analysis to look at the determinants of increasing state involvement, this article shows that election results for the ruling president and his party, as well as the degree to which elections are manipulated throughout Russia's regions, are significantly and positively correlated with the number of raids in a given region, while regions with governors that have stronger local ties are characterized by a smaller number of attacks. A potential interpretation of these findings is that the federal center may tolerate a certain degree of predatory activities by regional elites, as long as these elites are able to deliver a sufficiently high level of electoral support for the center, with the effect being weaker in regions where the governor is interested in the long-term development of the regional economy. Date: 2014 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rpsaxx:v:30:y:2014:i:2-3:p:89-114 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2013.856573 Access Statistics for this article Post-Soviet Affairs is currently edited by Timothy Frye More articles in Post-Soviet Affairs from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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