Independent or lonely? Central banking in crisis

Deborah Mabbett and Waltraud Schelkle

Review of International Political Economy, 2019, vol. 26, issue 3, 436-460

Abstract: The financial crisis has called our understanding of central bank independence (CBI) into question. Central banks were praised for bold interventions but simultaneously criticized for overreaching their mandates. Central bankers themselves have complained that they are ‘the only game in town’. We develop the second generation theory of CBI to understand how independence can turn into loneliness when a financial crisis calls for cooperation between fiscal authorities and the central bank. Central banks are protected from interference when there are multiple political veto-players, but the latter can also block cooperation. Furthermore, central banks in multi-veto-player systems operate under legal constraints on their financial stabilization actions. They can circumvent these constraints, but this invites criticism and retribution. More surprisingly, central banks have strategically invoked their constraints to gain cooperation from political authorities.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2018.1554539

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