The dynamical stability for an evolutionary language game under selection-mutation dynamics

Seigo Uchida and Masakazu Fukuzumi

No e115, Working Papers from Tokyo Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We present complete results pertaining to the dynamical stability for sender-receiver games following Lewis (1969), and Nowak and Krakauer (1999) under the selection-mutation dynamics. Our research reveals that two distinct classes of neutrally stable strategies have a distinguishing feature of the dynamic stability. The rest points close to the strategies of these classes are asymptotically stable and all rest points other than these are not.

Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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