Efficiency and stability in sender-receiver games under the selection-mutation dynamics

Seigo Uchida

No e132, Working Papers from Tokyo Center for Economic Research

Abstract: Our study aims to reveal the relationship between the efficiency of neutrally stable strategies and asymptotic stability of rest points close to those strategies in Lewis-type sender-receiver games under the selection-mutation dynamics. We focus on the game in which the number of states is not equal to that of signals. While no strict Nash strategy exists in our case, we show that there are some neutrally stable strategies that have rest points close to these strategies, and that these rest points can be asymptotically stable under the selection-mutation dynamics. Moreover, those neutrally stable strategies give agents the maximal payoff. We name those neutrally stable strategies the extended signaling system, the unilaterally mixed strategy, and the max hybrid strategy.

Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2019-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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