A Methodological Note on a Weighted Voting Experiment

Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Naoki Watanabe, Gabriele Esposito and Xiaoyan Lu

No e063, Working Papers from Tokyo Center for Economic Research

Abstract: We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (2008): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round (random role, RR, versus fixed role, FR) and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve (multiple approval, MA, versus single approval, SA). It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions as well as how negotiations proceed. Our analysis favors a protocol with FR-SA for future research, because this protocol induces subjects to commit fewer errors in their decision making than the protocol with RR-MA, and because proposal-objection dynamics are more frequently observed under FR-SA than under RR-MA.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tcer.or.jp/wp/pdf/e63.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment (2014)
Working Paper: A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e63

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Tokyo Center for Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().