The Kernel of a Patent Licensing Game

Shin Kishimoto and Naoki Watanabe

No e075, Working Papers from Tokyo Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper considers general bargaining outcomes under coalition structures formed by an external patent holder and firms in oligopoly markets. The main propositions are as follows. For each coalition structure, the kernel is a singleton; thus, the number of licensees that maximizes the patent holder's revenue can be determined. The upper and lower bounds of the kernel are specified for each coalition structure. We also provide sufficient conditions for the number of licensees that maximizes their total surplus to be optimal for the patent holder.

Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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