Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa and Passarelli Francesco

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Abstract: Messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements in a game with pre-play bilateral communication. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor agreements. We report supporting results from an experiment.

Date: 2022-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: Promises or agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication (2023)
Working Paper: Promises or Agreements? Moral commitments in bilateral communication (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:00153

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