Limit Pricing and Entry Game of Renewable Energy Firms into the Energy Sector

Willi Semmler, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Behnaz Minooei Fard and Joao Paulo Braga

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Abstract: In the energy sector, fossil fuel incumbents often inhibit renewable energy entrants. This paper presents a game-theoretic model of competition between these firms. Using a dynamic limit pricing model, we study entry dynamics and the effects of financial and fiscal policies on competition, applying nonlinear model predictive control for scenario prediction.

Keywords: limit pricing; renewable energy; fossil fuels; game theory; model predictive control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 L11 Q42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Limit pricing and entry game of renewable energy firms into the energy sector (2022)
Working Paper: Limit Pricing and Entry Game of Renewable Energy Firms into the Energy Sector (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:00158

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