The role of screening and cross-selling in bank-firm relationships

Cosci Stefania and Valentina Meliciani ()

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Abstract: This paper presents a monopolistic competition model of a bank choosing the optimal level of the screening effort in the presence of cross-selling activities. We demonstrate that, in absence of informational synergies, the larger is the range of services that the bank produces, the lower is the optimal screening effort. The paper also analyses the impact of competition in the lending market on cross-selling activities and finds that, for sufficiently low levels of transportation costs, an increase in competition in the lending market increases the expected profitability of services, thus increasing banks’ incentives to engage in cross-selling activities.

Keywords: Policy games; policy effectiveness; controllability; Nash equilibrium existence; rational expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:0033

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