Nontransferable Utility Bankruptcy Games

Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Peter Borm and M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
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Arantza Estévez-Fernández: VU University Amsterdam
M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo, Spain
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arantza Estévez Fernández

No 14-030/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalitional merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the NTU-adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.

Keywords: NTU-bankruptcy problem; NTU-bankruptcy game; Coalitional merge convexity; Ordinal convexity; Compromise stability; Core cover; Adjusted proportional rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20140030

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