River Sharing and Water Trade

Erik Ansink, Michael Gengenbach and Hans-Peter Weikard
Additional contact information
Michael Gengenbach: Wageningen University, the Netherlands

No 15-001/VIII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not emerge if there are four or more agents along the river. Instead, a partial market may emerge where a subset of agents trades river water while other agents can take some of the river water that passes their territory.

Keywords: river sharing; water trade; market emergence; property rights; coalition stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://papers.tinbergen.nl/15001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: River Sharing and Water Trade (2013)
Working Paper: River Sharing and Water Trade (2012)
Working Paper: River Sharing and Water Trade (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150001

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