That's Just - Not Fair: Gender Differences in Notions of Justice
Nicole Becker,
Kirsten Häger and
Jan Heufer
Additional contact information
Nicole Becker: TU Dortmund, Germany
Kirsten Häger: Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany
Jan Heufer: Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands
No 15-103/I, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
Abstract:
In Becker et al. (2013a,b), we proposed a theory to explain giving behaviour in dictator experiments by a combination of selfishness and a notion of justice. The theory was tested using dictator, social planner, and veil of ignorance experiments. Here we analyse gender differences in preferences for giving and notions of justice in experiments using the same data. Similar to Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), we find some differences in giving behaviour. We find even stronger differences in the notion of justice between men and women; women tend to be far more egalitarian. Using our preference decomposition approach from Becker et al. (2013a) and parametric estimates, we show that differences in the giving behaviour between men and women in dictator experiments are explained by differences in their notion of justice and not by different levels of selfishness. We employ both parametric and non-parametric techniques, and both methods confirm the result.
Keywords: Altruism; Dictator Games; Distribution; Experimental Economics; Gender Differences; Justice; Social Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D12 D61 D63 D64 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-ger, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/15103.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150103
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().