Cartel Dating

H. Peter Boswijk (), Maurice J.G. Bun and Maarten Pieter Schinkel
Additional contact information
Maurice J.G. Bun: University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Maarten Pieter Schinkel: University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

No 16-092/VII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: The begin and end dates of cartels are often ambiguous, despite competition authorities stating them with precision. The legally established infringement period(s), based on documentary evidence, need not coincide with the period(s) of actual cartel effects. In this paper, we show that misdating cartel effects leads to a (weak) overestimation of but-for prices and an underestimation of overcharges. Total overcharges based on comparing but-for prices to actual prices are a (weak) underestimation of the true amount overcharged, irrespective of the type and size of the misdating. The bias in antitrust damage estimation based on predicted cartel prices can have either sign. We extend the before-during-and-after method with an empirical cartel dating procedure that uses multiple structural break tests to determine the actual begin and end date(s) of the effects of collusive agreements. Empirical findings in the European Sodium Chlorate cartel corroborate our theoretical results.

Keywords: Cartel; antitrust damages; dates; structural change; break test; but-for (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C22 C51 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Cartel dating (2019)
Working Paper: Cartel dating (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20160092

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