Highway toll allocation

Hao Wu, Rene van den Brink and Arantza Estevez-Fernandez
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Hao Wu: Hunan University
Rene van den Brink: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Arantza Estevez-Fernandez: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 22-036/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper analyzes the allocation of the total toll collected in a highway among its segments. Based on different toll charging rules, we propose the Segments Equal Sharing method, the Exits Equal Sharing method, and the Entrances Equal Sharing method. We provide axioms and characterize these methods used to distribute the toll. Besides, we show how these methods can be obtained by applying the Shapley value to associated coalitional transferable utility games.

Keywords: Highway toll allocation problem; Axiomatic characterization; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 R49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-06-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-tre and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220036

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