Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Jan Boone

No 2014-059, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: universal basic health insurance; voluntary supplementary insurance; public vs private insurance; adverse selection; moral hazard; cost effectiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-ias
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Related works:
Journal Article: Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection (2015)
Working Paper: Basic versus supplementary health insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection (2014)
Working Paper: Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2014)
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