Optimal Deterrence of Illegal Behavior Under Imperfect Corporate Governance

Cédric Argenton and Eric van Damme

No 2014-078, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: illegal behavior; deterrence; agency problems; moral hazard; corporate liability; corporate crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Optimal Deterrence of Illegal Behavior Under Imperfect Corporate Governance (2014)
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