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Riccardo Ghidoni and Sigrid Suetens
No 2019-016, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Keywords: cooperation; infinitely repeated games; sequential prisoner's dilemma; strategic uncertainty; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2019 New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ore References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc Citations:
Downloads: (external link)https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstream ... 79a36513924/download (application/pdf)
Related works:Working Paper: Empirical evidence on repeated sequential games (2019) Working Paper: Empirical Evidence on Repeated Sequential Games (2019) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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