An empirical test of Holmstroem's principal-agent model that takes tax and signally hypotheses explicitly into account

H.G. Barkema
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H.G. Barkema: Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics

No FEW 405, Research Memorandum from Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management

Keywords: Management; Incentives; labour economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1989
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