Budget-feasible mechanism design for non-monotone submodular objectives: Offline and online

Georgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer and Guido Schäfer
Additional contact information
Pieter Kleer: Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management

Other publications TiSEM from Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management

Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstream ... ddd678eb3c2/download (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tiu:tiutis:105391ba-4a4a-4758-991c-ad81bc5a5916

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Other publications TiSEM from Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard Broekman ().