Bonacich Measures as Equilibria in Network Models

Hannu Salonen

No 100, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: We investigate the cases when the Bonacich measures of strongly connected directed bipartite networks can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. One such case is a two-person game such that the utility functions are bilinear, the matrices of these bilinear forms represent the network, and strategies have norm at most one. Another example is a two-person game with quadratic utility functions. A third example is an m + n person game with quadratic utilitity functions, where the matrices representing the network have dimension m × n. For connected directed bipartite networks we show that the Bonacich measures are unique and give a recursion formula for the computation of the measures. The Bonacich measures of such networks can be interpreted as a subgame perfect equilibrium path of an extensive form game with almost perfect information.

Keywords: networks; influence measures; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gth, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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