Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility

Ville Korpela

No 110, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: Often preferences of agents are such that any sensible goal of the collective must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demand that in this case all alternatives are equilibrium outcomes of the social choice mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome of a game, we could just as well demand that there are no equilibria at all. Although this may seem innocent, and in a technical sense that’s right, it is a neglected path to possibility.

Keywords: Condorcet Criterion; Collective Decision Making; Implementation; Impossibility Result; Nash Equilibrium; Social Choice Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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