Congestion, Coordination and Matching

Marja-Liisa Halko and Hannu Salonen

No 28, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite congestion and coordination games. Player set is divided into two disjoint groups, called men and women. A man choosing an action a is better off if the number of other men choosing a decreases, or if the number of women choosing a increases. Analogously, a woman becomes better off if more men or fewer women choose the same action as she does. Existence proofs are constructive: we build simple ``best reply'' algorithms that converge to an equilibrium.

Keywords: congestion; coordination; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C78 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2008-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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