On Markovian Cake Sharing Problems

Hannu Salonen

No 72, Discussion Papers from Aboa Centre for Economics

Abstract: Pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in dynamic cake sharing problems are analyzed. Each player chooses under perfect information how much to eat from the current cake and how much to leave to the next period. The left over cake grows according to a given growth function. With linear utilities and strictly concave increasing growth function the only symmetric equilibrium with continuous strategies is the trivial equilibrium in which a player eats the whole cake whenever it is his turn to move. This is quite different than in the corresponding single person decision problem (or at a social optimum) where the cake grows from small initial values towards the steady state. A non-trivial equilibrium with a positive steady state exist in the game. In such an equilibrium strategies cannot be continuous. When utilities are concave and the growth function is linear, a nontrivial MPE with a positive steady state may not exist.

Keywords: common pool resources; dynamic cake sharing; Markov perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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