Bank Distress and the Borrowers' Productivity

Keiichiro Kobayashi and Noriyuki Yanagawa
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Noriyuki Yanagawa: Faculty of Economics, University of Toyama

No CIRJE-F-521, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: In this paper, we propose a theoretical model in which a banking crisis (or bank distress) causes declines in the aggregate productivity. When borrowing firms need additional bank loans to continue their businesses, a high probability of bank failure discourages ex ante investments (i.e., "specialization") by the firms that enhance their productivity. In a general equilibrium setting, we also show that there may be multiple equilibria, in one of which bank distress continues and the borrowers' productivity is low, and in the other equilibrium, banks are healthy and the borrowers' productivity is high. We show that the bank capital requirement may be effective to eliminate the bad equilibrium and may lead the economy to the good equilibrium in which the productivity of borrowing firms and the aggregate output are both high and the probability of bank failure is low.

Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-bec and nep-eff
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http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2007/2007cf521.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bank distress and the borrowers' productivity (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2007cf521

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