Board's Monitoring and Retention of Sub-standard and Powerless CEOs

Meg Sato
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Meg Sato: Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University

No CIRJE-F-711, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: Do corporate boards look after shareholder interests? This paper shows that CEO replacement may exhibit excessive inertia, in favor of the incumbent board of directors. I show that even when there is no relationship between the board of directors and CEO, or no threat of the CEO.s power over the board of directors, there is a case in which the board wants to keep sub-standard CEOs.

Pages: 10pages
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-cdm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2010cf711

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