Short-run Incentive and Information in Sequential Adoptions: An Antenatal Care Experiment in Rural Nigeria

Yoshito Takasaki and Ryoko Sato
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Ryoko Sato: Poverty and Equity Global Practice, The World Bank

No CIRJE-F-1070, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper experimentally studies sequential adoptions of antenatal care in rural Nigeria. We consider two policy targets: nonadopters, who make no adoptions, and late adopters, who make a first adoption late. Incentivizing first adoption can sustainably promote sequential adoptions if nonadopters positively update their belief about the product or shift their dynamic decision (even without learning) or if late adopters hasten their adoption sequence. We jointly examine sustainability and complementarity of interventions. Cash incentive promoted hastening, but not learning or shifting. Information intervention was ineffective. Bundled information, however, nullified the hastening, because the composition of compliers to the incentive changed.

Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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