Probabilistic Approach to Mean Field Games and Mean Field Type Control Problems with Multiple Populations

Masaaki Fujii
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Masaaki Fujii: Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

No CIRJE-F-1133, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: In this work, we systematically investigate mean field games and mean field type control problems with multiple populations. We study the mean field limits of the three different situations; (i) every agent is non-cooperative; (ii) the agents within each population are cooperative; and (iii) the agents in some populations are cooperative. We provide several sets of sufficient conditions for the existence of a mean field equilibrium for each case. We also show that, under appropriate conditions, each mean field solution actually provides an approximate Nash equilibrium for the corresponding game with a large but finite number of agents.

Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1133

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