Cooperation in Revision Games and Some Applications

Yuichiro Kamada and Michihiro Kandori
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Yuichiro Kamada: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley

No CIRJE-F-1135, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: The present paper provides some examples that illustrate how cooperation is achieved among rational and selfish agents when (i) they prepare their actions in advance and (ii) they have some opportunities to revise their actions. Specifically, we use the framework of revision games introduced by Kamada and Kandori (2019). To judge the sustainability of cooperation in the examples, we show and utilize a simple and useful lemma.

Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1135

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