On Markov perfect equilibria in baseball

Akifumi Kira and Keisuke Inakawa

No 115, TMARG Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University

Abstract: We formulate baseball as a finite Markov game with approximately 3.5 million states. The manager of each opposing team is the player who maximizes the probability of their team winning. We derive, using dynamic programming, a recursive formula which is satisfied by Markov perfect equilibria and the value functions of the game for both teams. By solving this recursive formula, we can obtain optimal strategies for each condition. We demonstrate with numerical experiments that these can be calculated in approximately 1 second per game.

Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10097/57096

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:toh:tmarga:115

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TMARG Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tohoku University Library ().