Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China

Loren Brandt (), Scott Rozelle and Matthew Turner

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: Secure land tenure is important to the development process, but China’s rural reforms have so far failed to provide farm households with this security. We examine the political economy of land tenure and find that local governments sacrifice tenure security in the interests of efficiency and equity. Local rent seeking also plays an important role, and is a likely source of the under-development of land rental markets. Our results further suggest that decreases in distortionary taxes and increases in the integrity of elections will lead to more secure tenure and an increased reliance on market land exchange.

JEL-codes: Q13 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2002-07-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China (2004)
Working Paper: LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR AND PROPERTY RIGHTS FORMATION IN RURAL CHINA (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:mturner-02-01

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