Strategic and extensive games

Martin Osborne

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is described. Strategic game, Bayesian games, extensive games with perfect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, subgame perfect equilibrium, and weak sequential equilibrium.

Keywords: Strategic games; Bayesian games; extensive games; Nash equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; subgame perfect equilibrium; sequential equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2006-05-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-231

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