Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions under Restricted Stochastic Dominance

Yao Luo

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the identification of first-price auctions with nonseparable unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we extend Hu, McAdams, and Shum (2013) by relaxing the first-order stochastic dominance condition. Instead, we assume restricted stochastic dominance relations among the value quantile functions and show that the same relations pass to the bid quantile functions. An ordered tree summarizes these relations and provides a total ordering. Relying on the proposed restricted stochastic dominance ordering, we extend a list of identification results in the empirical auction literature.

Keywords: Restricted Stochastic Dominance; Unobserved Heterogeneity; Identification; Misclassification; Auction; Risk Aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2018-05-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-606.pdf Main Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-606

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().