Dynamic Decision Making Under Rolling Admissions: Evidence from U.S. Law School Applications

Yao Luo and Yu Wang

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: Admission processes in many higher education markets are inherently dynamic. We study timing of student application and school admission under rolling admissions using a unique U.S. law school market dataset. Our results show that law schools employ non-stationary admission standards within application cycles: applications submitted earlier enjoy a considerable admission advantage relative to later applications. We rationalize such strategies in a simple yield management model and provide evidence for three types of frictions that constrain applicants from applying earlier.

Keywords: Matching; Decentralized; Timing; Frictions; Higher Education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2020-12-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-edu
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-681.pdf Main Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-681

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().