Development and Decay: Political Organization, Economic Conditions, and Municipal Corruption in Puerto Rico, 1952-2015
Gustavo Bobonis,
Luis Cámara Fuertes,
Harold Toro and
Julie Wilson
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Corruption has been a salient feature of Puerto Rico (PR)’s modern history. However, systematic empirical research on this subject has been generally lacking. In this paper, we examine trends and patterns in municipal government malfeasance and corruption during a period spanning over six decades. Using data from all municipal audit reports conducted by the PR Office of the Comptroller between 1952 through 2015, we characterize patterns of corruption across three periods of change that altered governance practices in the territory: the time of hegemonic dominance of the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), the era of intense political competition between the PPD and the pro-statehood Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP), and the final collapse of the territory’s institutional model. We show that institutions and political practices, as opposed to economic determinants, play a key role in explaining corruption patterns. We argue that corruption patterns can be explained through the lens of politics in divided and polarized societies.
Keywords: corruption; clientelist politics; anti-corruption audits; accountability; political polarization; divided societies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 J15 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2021-01-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-his and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-687.pdf Main Text (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-687
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().