Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?
Gustavo Bobonis,
Paul Gertler,
Marco Gonzalez-Navarro and
Simeon Nichter
Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? We examine the impact of a prominent anti-corruption program on clientelism using a novel representative survey of rural Brazilians. Randomized audits reduce politicians’ provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens’ demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. With regards to mechanisms, audits undermine clientelist relationships by reducing citizens’ interactions with politicians and their knowledge of incumbents. Furthermore, audits significantly deteriorate citizens’ perceptions of politician reciprocity in a hypothetical trust game. Results also offer novel insights into audits’ dynamic effects: they have more pronounced effects in the short run, especially during electoral periods.
Keywords: political clientelism; audits; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2023-05-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-inv and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism? (2023)
Working Paper: Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism? (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-752
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