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Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance in the EU and Japan

Juergen von Hagen

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: Fiscal rules specify quantitative targets for key budgetary aggregates. In this paper, we review the experience with such rules in Japan and in the EU. Comparing the performance of fiscal policy in the 1980s and 1990s until 2003, we find that the fiscal rule of the 1980s exerted some but not much disciplinary influence on Japanese fiscal policy. The fiscal rule of the Maastricht Treaty had a significant impact on political budget cycles in the EU, but did little to constrain fiscal policy in the large member states. Since the start of the European Monetary Union, the disciplinary effect of the fiscal rule in the EU has vanished. Next, we discuss the importance of budgetary institutions for the effectiveness of fiscal rules. In Europe, a number of countries adopted strong fiscal rules, i.e., a fiscal rule combined with a design of the budget process enabling governments to commit to the rule. We find that strong fiscal rules have been effective. We conclude with some suggestions for the design of a strong fiscal rule in Japan.

Keywords: Fiscal policy; political budget cycles; government budgeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H61 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-pbe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Working Paper: Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance in the EU and Japan (2005) Downloads
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