Breaking Up a Research Consortium
Andras Niedermayer and
Jianjun Wu
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich
Abstract:
Inter-firm R&D collaborations through contractual arrangements have become increasingly popular, but in many cases they are broken up without any joint discovery. We provide a rationale for the breakup date in R&D collaboration agreements. More specifically, we consider a research consortium initiated by a firm A with a firm B. B has private information about whether it is committed to the project or a free-rider. We show that under fairly general conditions, a breakup date in the contract is a (secondbest) optimal screening device for firm A to screen out free-riders. With the additional constraint of renegotiation proofness, A can only partially screen out free-riders: entry by some free-riders makes sure that A does not have an incentive to renegotiate the contract ex post. We also propose empirical strategies for identifying the three likely causes of a breakup date: adverse selection, moral hazard, and project non-viability.
Keywords: Optimal R&D contracts; adverse selection; breakup date; R&D collaboration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-ino, nep-mic, nep-ppm and nep-tid
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:433
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