Procurement and Predation: Dynamic Sourcing from Financially Constrained Suppliers

Malin Arve

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agency’s optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By considering a dynamic setting, both present and future consequences and incentives are taken into account.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Dual sourcing; Favoritism; Financial constraints; Procurement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G30 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-cta
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https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17402/1/441.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Procurement and predation: Dynamic sourcing from financially constrained suppliers (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:441

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